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McLaren: The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Independent Arena for the

THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT:
AN INDEPENDENT ARENA FOR THE
WORLD'S SPORTS DISPUTES
Richard H. McLaren"
I. INTRODUCrION
The very essence of sport is competition. Through the competitive
spirit, athletes play against one another to determine who is best.
Fundamental to each athlete's competitive spirit is the concept of an
equal playing field, enshrining the importance of honor and mutual
respect.
A simplistic view of sports, however, is no longer possible as politics
and economic incentives cast a darkening shadow across the playing
field. In a world where the stakes of winning have risen enormously, the
Olympic ideal is in danger of becoming an anachronism. At one time it
was thought that "[t]he most important thing in the Olympic Games is
not to win but to take part. ...
"I It is no longer just the thrill of
competing, however, but winning that is required. "Olympic athletes,
especially gold medallists, stand to make a fortune on lucrative
2
endorsement contracts."
Today athletes can achieve their goals by adhering to strict regimens
of training, diet, and practice.
They can also excel beyond the
boundaries of their natural ability by enhancing their performance with
drugs. The magnetism of performance enhancing drugs is stronger than
ever as the riches associated with victory continue to grow. Athletes feel
pressure from all directions to win and often succumb to the lure of
drugs, to gain an unfair advantage over their competitors.

* Professor Richard H. McLaren, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario. I would
like to acknowledge the contribution and assistance of my researcher Jim Bunting of the
Western Law Class of 2002. [ am indebted to him for his excellent work with me on this
Article.
I Oversight ofActivities of the Olympic Committee: Hearings Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1994)

(statement of Anita L Defrantz, President, Amateur Athletic Foundation of Los Angeles)
(quoting statement attributable to Pierre De Coubertin).

2 Edward E. Hollis, Note, The United States Olympic Committee and the Suspension of Athletes:
Reforming Grievance Procedures Under the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 71 IND. UJ. 183, 183
(1995).
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A challenge of the new millennium is to eradicate performance
enhancing drugs from sport and to redirect sport back to its competitive
roots without the influence of unfair advantages and victory without
honor. When sufficient time has passed, historians may look back on the
Summer Olympic Games at Sydney and find that those games were the
3
turning point on the anti-doping attack.
The Court of Arbitration for Sport ("CAS") is the final checkpoint in
the preventative process for doping in sport. If successful, the CAS
reinforces the deterrent effect of drug testing carried out at the Olympic
Games by the World Anti-Doping Agency ("WADA"). 4 This paper
examines the legal machinery that attempts to channel all athletes to
compete in every respect on a level playing field, particularly without

the unfair advantage of performance enhancing drugs. The CAS case
developments of the millennium year, including the fifteen cases and
fourteen decisions of the Ad Hoc Division, s are examined to determine if
the machinery of CAS will contribute to the containment of drugs 6 and
more broadly to a fairer playing arena for the athlete.
II. THE PRIVATE CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF SPORT

Most sports organizations are private, voluntary associations and are
not governed by public authorities exercising statutory powers. 7 As a

3 WADA Independent Observer Report, Olympic Sunner Games 2000: Sydney, Australia,
available at http://www.wada-ama.org/asiakas/003/wada-english.nsf/Home?OpenPage
(last visited Jan. 9, 2001).
4 The World Anti-Doping Agency ("WADA") was created on November 10, 1999. See
World Anti-Doping Agency, WADA History, available at http://www.wadaama.org/asiakas/003/wada-english.nsf/SWP/12 (last visited Jan. 9, 2001). This agency
was joined at the national level in the United States by the United States of America Anti
Doping Agency ("USADA"). See USADA, Doping Control Officers Program, available at
http://www.usantidoping.org/control-program/index.htm (last visited Jan. 9,2001). The
USADA is an independent agency that has contracted with the USOC to do all the testing
for competition, with no advanced notice, in the United States. Id.
5 For a discussion of the AHD experience at the Atlanta and Nagano Games see Richard
McLaren, A New Order:Athletes' Rights and the Court of Arbitration at the Olympic Games, 7
OLYMPIKA 1, 3 (1998). See also Michael Beloff, The Court of Arbitrationfor Sport at the
Olympics, Sports and L.J. of the British Assoc. for Sport and the Law (1998) (on file with author).
6 The Sydney Summer Olympic Games resulted in the greatest number of positive drug
tests during any games. For a partial listing of modem history of doping in sport see

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE USE OF DRUGS AND BANNED PRACTICES INTENDED TO

INCREASE ATHLETIC PERFORMANCE 71-74 (1990) (the "Dubin Report"). This is an idea which
is picked up on by the Office of the Independent Observer in its report to WADA. See
WADA Independent Observer Report, Olympic Games 2000: Sydney Australia, supra note 3,
at 14.
7 John.Barnes, SPORTS AND THE LAw IN CANADA 143 (3d ed. 1996).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol35/iss2/3

McLaren: The Court of Arbitration for Sport: An Independent Arena for the

20011

CAS: AN INDEPENDENT ARENA

381

result the majority of disputes involving sports organizations are
governed by contractual principles.
Differing legal systems and
principles may be applied to various sports and athletes. Each nation
and indeed each sport, is different and it is an immense task to
effectively bring together a diverse number of rules, legal systems,
opinions, philosophies of law, and goals. Further, the nature of sport
makes expeditious dispute resolution a necessity. As a consequence,
sports related disputes are increasingly resolved by arbitration panels.
In this respect sports bodies either employ their own arbitration panel8
or submit their disputes to the CAS.
The CAS was established on April 6, 1983, at an IOC session in New
Delhi,9 and since that time has dealt with sports-specific disputes of a
private nature. The court provides a forum for the world's athletes and
sports federations to resolve their disputes through a single,
independent and accomplished sports adjudication body that is capable
of consistently applying the rules of different sports organizations and
the world wide rules of the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code.'0
The CAS provides a unifying institution that can help deliver sport
back to its origins. It can be the unifying body that ensures fairness and
integrity in sport through sound legal control and the administration of
diverse laws and philosophies.
In this respect, the CAS is in the course of developing universal
principles that will some day be widely recognized as the lex sportiva. 1
Despite the growth and success of the CAS, some International
Federations ("IFs") have not agreed to use the CAS for dispute
settlement. The International Amateur Athletic Federation ("IAAF") and
Fd~ration Internationale de Football Association ("FIFA") choose to
have their own competing body of adjudicative experts. The difficulty
with such IF based sport specific arbitration panels is that they lack
independence and have not developed a universal body of sports
jurisprudence.' 2 The lack of independence has also been a criticism of

8 The International

Amateur Athletic Federation ("IAAF") is one such body.
9 Nancy K. Raber, Dispute Resolution in Olympic Sport: The Court of Arbitrationfor Sport, 8
SETON HALL J. SPORT L 75, 82-83 (1998).

10Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code 2000, available at http://www.olympic.org/
ioc/e/org/medcom/pdf/dopingcode.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2001).
11A term coined by the Acting General Secretary of CAS Matthieu Reeb at the time of the
publishing of the first digest of CAS decisions stretching over the period from 1983-1998.
12 See Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 06, Dieter Baumann v. IOC,
award of 22 Sept., 2000, reprinted iniMATrIEU REEB, CAS AWARDS-SYDNEY 2000:
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CAS;13 at its extreme CAS has been described as a court of vassals of the
IOC brought along to the Games to do its bidding. A proper assessment
of both systems will demonstrate that CAS has developed into an
independent body, while the IF's arbitration panels are burdened by
problems inherent to internal sport specific panels.
Whatever the merits of these different adjudicative panels, they are
all established by contractual agreement to arbitrate disputes when they
arise. This consensual basis to the arbitration mechanism must be kept
in mind when analyzing decisions. Sports arbitrations only exist because
the athlete, the national governing body ("N.G.B."), and others in the
sport world have agreed to be bound by arbitration and the outcome of
the case.

A. The CAS as an Independent Body
The CAS was subjected to a great deal of criticism following its
decision regarding Romanian gymnast Andreea Raducan. As mentioned

above, the CAS has been referred to as vassals of the IOC brought along
to the Games to do the IOC's bidding. Criticism of this nature is
unfounded. Following a recommendation by the Swiss Federal Tribunal
that the CAS reduce its level of dependence on the IOC, 14 it created the
International Council of Arbitration for Sport ("ICAS").15 It is composed
of a twenty-member council and its membership consists of

DECISIONS DELIVERED BY THE AD HOC DIVISION OF THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT
DURING THE 2000 GAMES IN SYDNEY 65 (Lausanne, ICAS, 2000). The internal adjudicative
body of German Athletics is trying to insert a notion of intent into doping cases and the
IAAF panel rejects the theory. Id. It is this CAS decision that ultimately finds favor both
with the athlete and with the sports world press. See First-Class Verdict of Guilt,
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZErTUNG, Sept. 23, 2000; It Is Not Over, It Just Started,
SAARBRUCKER ZEITUNG, Sept. 23,2000. The German athlete Dierter Baumann was a former
Olympic champion in Barcelona (5,000 m.) who had filed an appeal with the Ad Hoc
Division of the CAS seeking to have the decision of the IAAF arbitration panel on
September 18, 2000, rendered without effect on his admission to the Games. The IAAF
panel had imposed a two year ban for a positive test for nandrolone arising out of two
competition doping control tests in October and November of 1999.
3
RECUEIL DES SENTENCES DU TAS/DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998 561 (Matthieu Reeb
ed., 1998).
'4 Raber, supra note 9, at 83. See also RECUEIL DES SENTENCES DU TAS/DIGEST OF CAS
AWARDS 1986-1998, supranote 13, at 561.
15The IOC approved the creation of ICAS on June 22, 1994. The new body acts as
supervisor and financier of CAS, effectively transferring the responsibility of guaranteeing
the autonomy of CAS from the IOC to the new body. This notion of an independent
agency, free of control from its creator and founder, has been the model selected for the
establishment of WADA in 2000 and the effectuation of the USADA on October 1, 2000.
The model originally adopted by CAS is proving to be a very workable one.
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representatives from IFs, National Organizations ("NOs"), and the
International Olympic Committee ("IOC"). Each member of CAS signs a
declaration "undertaking to perform their functions in a personal
capacity, with total objectivity and independence, and in conformity
with the provisions of the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration." 16 ICAS
members are also prohibited from serving as CAS arbitrators or acting as
counsel to any party appearing before CAS. Generally, it is thought that
this restructuring has aided in a perception that the CAS is an
independent body.
The strongest proof that the CAS has achieved independence can be
found within numerous decisions of the court. Indeed, the CAS has
asserted its independence by overturning cases decided differently by

the IOC 17 and by criticizing the IOC where it has failed to act with
decisiveness.' 8 The IOC's inaction has even been met with remedial
corrective action by the CAS when it recognized the unwillingness of the
IOC to respond. 19
In addition, the New South Wales Court of Appeal ("NSWCA") gave
the CAS a resounding endorsement when it dismissed an application
from an Australian athlete who had lost a team selection issue before the
CAS (Oceania Registry).20 The appeal marked the first court challenge to

a ruling from the Oceania Division of CAS. The NSWCA dismissed the
case holding that "the various documents signed by the... athletes and

16Melissa R. Bitting, Mandatory, Binding Arbitration for Olympic Athletes: Is the Process Better
or Worse for Job Sectrity? 25 FLA. ST. U. L REv. 674 (1998).
17 During the Sydney Games the CAS removed a suspension imposed by an IF and
affirmed by the IOC Executive Board. See Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney
2000), 10, Alan Tzagaev v. IWF, award of 25 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB, supra note 12, at
101. Further, at the Atlanta and Nagano Games, the CAS reversed decisions of the IOC
Medical Commission confirmed by the Executive Board of the IOC in the cases of Andrei
Korneev v. 1OC, Zakhar Gouliev v. lOC, and Ross Rebagliati v. 1OC.
18See Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney), 01, USOC and USA Canoe/Kayak
v. IOC, award of 13 Sept, 2000, reprinted in REEB, supra note 12, at 13; Arbitration CAS Ad
Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney), 03, Arturo Miranda v. 1OC, award of 13 Sept., 2000, reprinted
in REEB, supra note 12. at 29.
19Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000),'05, Angel Perez v. 1OC, award of
19 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB, supra note 12, at 53; Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division
(O.G. Sydney 2000), 09, in the matter of Angel Perez, award of 25 Sept., 2000, reprinted in
REEB, supra note 12, at 91.
20 Angela Raguz v. Rebecca Sullivan & ORS N.S.W.C.A. 290 (2000). This case involved only
Australian parties and the proceedings were exclusively conducted in Australia. The
deferment to the seat of arbitration in Lausanne Switzerland was a remarkable result which
greatly enhanced the CAS's authority. It is doubtful the court would have come to such a
conclusion without confidence in the independence and ability of the CAS.
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the... Federation of Australia constituted an interlocking arbitration
agreement to submit potential disputes... exclusively to arbitration,...
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport.... "21
B. Independence of Sport Specific Arbitration Panels
Sport specific panels can fail, or give the appearance of failing, to
adhere to the same standards of independence and neutrality that have
been established by the CAS. They do not have as much experience as
the CAS, and as a result may be more prone to reaching an erroneous
conclusion. 22 They may also suffer from the fact that, at the end of the
case, the politics of the sports organization can overrule the compelling
legal logic of the sports panel.23 Such difficulties are inherent to internal
sport specific arbitration panels. They lack independence, a fact for
which the CAS has been critical and taken steps to correct. They
represent a failure to recognize the necessity for the arbitration panel to
be independent, neutral, and impartial. These are the essential features
of an adjudicative process in which the athletes and the public can have
confidence.
The IAAF has recently addressed a significant number of doping
cases. Sports icons such as Dieter Baumann, Linford Christie, Merlene
Ottey, and Javier Sotomayor have all tested positive for prohibited
substances. The IAAF submitted these and other controversial/high
profile cases to their arbitration panel. The results of these arbitrations
indicate the difficulty and controversy that can arise in the absence of an
independent arbitration panel.
1. Merlene Ottey
Merlene Ottey ran in her first international track meet at the Pan
American Games in 1979. Since that time she has established herself as
Jamaica's most revered athlete, winning fourteen World Championship

z Id.
22 Merlene

Ottey v. IAAF, Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n (July 3, 2000) (Christopher Vedder,

Monty Hacker, James Murphy, arbitrators) (on file with author). The decision in this case
is wrong and the IAAF acknowledges the error in subsequent cases. See also Istvan Gyulai,
The Case ofMerlene Ottey, IAAF NEWs, July, 2000, at 4.

23 Javier Sotomayor v. IAAF, Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n. (July 24, 2000) (Christopher
Vedder, Loh Lin Kok, Cabo Verde Filho, arbitrators) (on file with author). In this case the
IAAF Council invoked an "exceptional circumstances" clause to reinstate Sotomayor after
he was found guilty of committing a doping offense by the IAAF Arbitration panel. Id.
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medals.24 She has competed in eight Olympic Games and amassed a
total of eight Olympic medals, including a silver medal in the 4 x 100
meter relay at the 2000 Games. Off the track Ottey has been a prominent
spokesperson for her country and the IAAF. Jamaica appointed her
Ambassador to the World and in 1998 the IAAF appointed her "Patron
of the Year of Women in Athletics."25 The Jamaican born sprinter was
the undisputed pride of her nation and poster girl for the IAAF until July
9, 1999, when an IOC accredited laboratory in Lausanne discovered the
presence of the prohibited substances 19-norandosterone and 19noretiocholane in a urine sample acquired from Ottey during
competition.
On confirmation of the B sample analysis, Ottey was suspended by
the IAAF pending a hearing before the Jamaican Amateur Athletic
Association Tribunal ("JAAA"). The JAAA tribunal determined that she
had not committed a doping offense and her suspension was lifted. The
IAAF, being dissatisfied with the national decision, appealed the dispute
to its own sports specific IAAF panel. 26
Nandrolone is endogenously produced in males and females. The
threshold is 2 ng/ml for males and 5 ng/ml for females. This difference
reflects the fact that greater quantities of nandrolone may be produced
during pregnancy or certain phases in a woman's menstrual cycle.
Ottey's A and B samples were recorded at 15 ng/ml and 14 ng/ml,
respectively. However, the panel found the specific gravity2 7 reading of
Ottey's samples to be above 1.025. As a result, the correction formula
was applied. After the application of the correction formula, the A and B
samples fell below the 10C threshold of 5 ng/ml for females. Therefore,
the panel held that a doping offense had not been committed and the
suspension was lifted.

24 IAAF, Who to Watch, available at http://cbc.ca/olympics/O2_sports/02-athletics/
01_100_women/100 womenwho.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
2 IAAF, 1998 - The Year of Women in Athletics, at http://www.iaaforg/ywa/patron.html
(last visited Jan. 10, 2001).
26

This is a practice that the IAAF is resorting. to on an increasingly frequent basis. There
are many explanations for the conduct of national decision making bodies, but nationalism
and the fear of being sued seem to be compelling in national bodies letting the athlete off in
doping cases. In the recent past, the IAAF has intervened in the cases of Baumann,
Christie, Ottey, Sotomayor, Cadagon, and Walker. In each of these cases matters have been
brought forward to the IAAF panel after a successful defense by the athlete at the national
level.
27Specific gravity is the ratio of the density of a sample compared to an equal volume of
water. Water has a specific gravity reading of one and as a sample becomes more
concentrated the specific gravity of the sample will rise.
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Since its release, the decision has been highly criticized and regarded
by the scientific community as flagrantly wrong. Dr. Christiane Ayotte,
a member of the IAAF Doping Commission and Laboratory Chief of the
IOC Accredited Laboratory in Montreal, indicated that the decision was
erroneous on two grounds. First, the Tribunal erred in accepting that
there was a change in the specific gravity of the specimen from the time
of voiding and the reading taken at the laboratory. A tentative measure
of the specific gravity was taken at the time of voiding using the dipstick
method, while the reading obtained by the laboratory testing was an
exact measure of the specific gravity. Given that the laboratory testing
measured specific gravity at 1.019, the correction formula should not
have been applied. Dr. Ayotte's position has the unanimous support of
at least six of the heads of IOC Accredited Laboratories.28
Perhaps more intriguing is Dr. Ayotte's second ground for
concluding that the Tribunal reached an erroneous conclusion. She
states that
even if one takes 1.025 as the specific gravity of the
specimen, the correction [formula] correctly applied
affords a value of 12 [ng/ml], still clearly above the
threshold of 5 ng/ml. The 'expert' took the wrong
formula which directly correlates to the control urine
containing 2 ng/ml for males. The panel then used a
multiplying factor of 2.5 (to make it 5 ng/ml for a
female) and therefore the result of 4.5 ng/ml is 2.5 times
lower [than what would have been achieved if the
proper formula had been applied].29
The panel erroneously concluded that "the correct specific gravity
reading to accept would be that taken at the time of voiding, which
would thus trigger the application of the correction formula." 30 The
panel reached this conclusion after relying on scientific experts. Thus, it
is difficult to say whether or not a different panel would have been
mislead. Further, the IAAF took action to acknowledge the decision as
wrong. This demonstrates the IAAF's interest in being accountable and
accurate. However, the fact that IAAF arbitrators are not entirely

Interview with Dr. Christiane Ayotte, Member of IAAF Doping Comm'n and Laboratory
Chief of the IOC Accredited Laboratory in Montreal, Que. and London, Ont. (Aug. 14,
2000).
2

29

Id.
0 Merlene Ottey v. IAAF, Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n. Uuly 3,2000) (Christopher Vedder,

3

Monty Hacker, James Murphy, arbitrators) (on file with author).
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independent from the IAAF Council makes it difficult for those goals to
be met. An excellent example of this difficulty is demonstrated by the
Cuban high jumping case, where the IAAF panel correctly found a
doping offense, 31 but the decision was overturned.
2. Javier Sotomayor
Javier Sotomayor holds the world record in the high jump and is the
only man in the world to have jumped eight feet in height. In 1992,
Javier won an Olympic gold medal in the high jump and became a sports
icon in his home country of Cuba. Javier is also a member of the IAAF
Athlete's Commission and has stood as an example of excellence in
athletics. However, on July 30, 1999, after his victory at the PanAm
Games, Javier Sotomayor tested positive for cocaine. Javier adamantly
denied using the drug. Cuban president Fidel Castro "and Cuban sports
officials... suggested that someone set up Sotomayor to besmirch the
country's sports program." 32 Cuba's national adjudication panel cleared
Sotomayor of the charges.
The IAAF arbitration panel addressed the arguments raised by the
Federaci6n Cubana de Atletisom ("FCA"). The FCA's contentions
included procedural arguments, allegations of tampered samples, and an
attack on the credibility of the Montreal Laboratory. The panel
addressed and dismissed each issue. They held that many of the FCA's
arguments "were mere allegations without any proof raised."3 As a
result, the panel concluded that Sotomayor "committed a doping offense
on 30 July 1999 and the FCA Hearing Boards decision.. . was erroneous.
Accordingly, Sotomayor became ineligible to compete for a minimum of
two years from 30 July, 1999 until 29 July, 2001."34
The IAAF Council reduced Sotomayor's suspension to 1 year of
ineligibility and Javier competed in the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games
winning the silver medal in High Jump. The IAAF overruled the
arbitration panel's decision by invoking Rule 60.8 of the IAAF Rules and
Regulations. Rule 60.8 allows an athlete to apply for reinstatement in
exceptional circumstances. The rule reads:

31Javier Sotomayor v. IAAF, Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n. (uly 24, 2000) (Christopher

Vedder, Lob Lin Kok, Cabo Verde Filho, arbitrators) (on file with author).
32Associated Press, Sotornayor to Make Pre-Olynpic Run in Europe (Aug. 8, 2000), availableat
http://espn.go.com/oly/news/2000/0808/674424.html.
3-1Javier Sotomayor v. IAAF, Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n. (July 24, 2000) (Christopher

Vedder, Lob Lin Kok, Cabo Verde Filho, arbitrators) (on file with author).
341d.
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In exceptional circumstances, an athlete may apply to
the Council for reinstatement before the IAAF's period
of eligibility has expired.
Where an athlete has provided substantial assistance to a
Member in the course of an enquiry into doping carried
out by that Member, this will normally be regarded by
the Council as constituting exceptional circumstances.
However, it is emphasized that only truly exceptional
circumstances will justify any reduction. Details of the
procedure and the criteria for application are to be
found in the "Procedural Guidelines for Doping
Control.-s
Pursuant to this Rule the IAAF Council reduced Sotomayor's suspension
to one year. IAAF president Lamine Diack stated "We thought the
athlete deserved a lot of our support .... We said we can give him the
possibility to compete again. He is a human being he made a mistake." 36
The basis for the reduction appears to have been Sotomayor's
"previously clean drug record and humanitarian work." 37 The Council's
decision has been met with a great deal of controversy. Mr. Ljungqvist,
head of the IAAF's Medical Committee believes that "it was a decision
An examination of the Rule itself and
against [IAAF] rules.. ."38
Sotomayor's history raises a great deal of skepticism about the decision.
The Rules indicate that "only truly exceptional circumstances will
justify any reduction." 39 There is no doubt that Sotomayor is a high
profile athlete and that he has made a significant contribution to his
sport. There is, however, some controversy over whether the Council
should have invoked the rule to reinstate Sotomayor. With the recent
public outcry against the use of drugs in sports, and the high number of
positive doping results that have emerged, it is imperative to strictly
enforce the anti-doping provisions of all sports, particularly those in high
profile cases. Notwithstanding the fact that a positive test raises
skepticism about such achievements, it is inappropriate to make

RULE 60.8 IAAF RULES AND REGULATIONS (emphasis added).
-6ESPN.com News Services High lumper Has Another Positive Test (Aug. 4, 2000), available at
http://espn.go.com/oly/news/2000/0804/668038.html.
37 Associated Press, IAAF Opens Doorfor Olynpic Cainp Baunann (Aug. 4, 2000), available at
http://espn.go.com/oly/news/2000/0802/664944.html.
- High Jumper Has Another Positive Test, supra note 36.
39

RULE 60.8 IAAF RULES AND REGULATIONS.
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The existence of the rule itself is problematic. It is contrary to sports
jurisprudence established by the CAS and it undermines the credibility,
independence, and neutrality of the IAAF arbitration panel. It had been
established that testimony professing innocence and a previously clean
record cannot exonerate an athlete where there is clear, scientific
evidence as to guilt. This principle was well stated in the CAS decision
of Mecca-Medina:
It is regrettable that the currency of such denial is
devalued by the fact that it is the common coin of the
guilty as well as the innocent. Oral testimony as to
innocence, however impressively given, cannot trump
scientific evidence as to guilt .... Strict liability rules do
not require investigation of motive or even consideration
of what sensible competitors might have done: it can
indeed be surmised that those who use prohibited
substances are by definition risk takers. Nor is a clean
record by itself impressive, when the offence is
constituted by the finding of a banned substance on a
particular date, not of a reprehensible course of
conduct. 40
The IAAF exceptional circumstances provision clearly goes against this
established legal canon.4'
Perhaps the most illuminating point that the Sotomayor case draws
out is that IAAF arbitrations are not necessarily binding. This is contrary
to the fundamental principle that arbitration be final and binding on the
bodies it presides over.42 It is completely inappropriate for one party to
an arbitration to have the power to alter the outcome of the arbitration
award. The exceptional circumstances provision allows IAAF arbitration

- See CAS 99/A/234 & TAS 99/A/235 David Meca-Medina & Igor Majcen v. FINA, at 10.17
(on file with author).
4
1 The CAS reaffirmed the application of the strict liability regime in the case of Andreea
Raducan. Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 11, Andreea Raducan v.
IOC, award of 28 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB, supra note 12, at 111 (holding that it had no
power to consider the subjective circumstances of a case under a strict liability regime).
42 By definition "[a]rbitration is a binding process of dispute resolution in which the facts of
a dispute are presented to an independent, neutral arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.. .
MCLAREN & SANDERSON, INNOVATIVE DIsPUTE RESOLUTON: THE ALTERNATIVE 1-5 (1994).
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to impose full sanctions on athletes only where the IAAF Council deems
it appropriate. As a consequence, IAAF Arbitrations can be reduced to a
formality and the ultimate outcome of a dispute may lie in the hands of
the IAAF Council.
C. Conclusion
An international arbitration system that is not independent and for
which there is a political override, no matter how well intended, will
ultimately bring both itself and its sports federation into disrepute. In
the end, the international panel is no more independent in its actions
than the national panels whose decisions they are reviewing.
At the Olympic Games, the CAS has the final say in any dispute.
Even the authority of the IOC cannot overturn a CAS decision. Contrast
this to the IAAF, where any arbitration result is subject to the scrutiny of
the IAAF council. Having established the foregoing principles it is time
to turn to the CAS jurisprudence at the Summer Olympic Games in
Sydney. Did the world's independent sports adjudication body remain
independent and impartial at the Games?
III. THE AD Hoc DIVISION OF THE CAS
The inaugural appearance of the Ad Hoc Division ("AHD") of the
CAS coincided with the Centennial Olympic Games in Atlanta in 1996.
The AHD was established under Rule 74 of the Olympic Charter.
During the defined period of the Olympic Games it presides over any
dispute in accordance with the Ad Hoc Rules of Arbitration.
The AHD is designed to augment, not attenuate, athletes' rights.43
The court's jurisdiction over the Games is affirmed by Article 74 of the
Olympic Charter and a clause contained in the Athletes Entry Form.
Disputes are presided over by a panel of three arbitrators from a pool of
ICAS arbitrators specially selected by CAS for the Games. Any decision
is final and binding with no possibility of appeal. Prior to the Sydney
Games, the AHD presided over the Atlanta and Nagano Games."
All CAS proceedings are governed by the CAS Arbitration Rules for
the Games of the XXVII Olympiad in Sydney ("the Ad Hoc Rules"),
enacted by the ICAS on November 29, 1999. They are further governed

"3See Beloff, supra note 5.
4For
a discussion of the AHD experience at the Atlanta and Nagano Games see MCLAREN,
supra note 5, at 1.
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by Chapter 12 of the Swiss Private International Law Act ("PIL Act") of
December 18, 1987. The PIL Act applies to arbitration as a result of the
express choice of law contained in Article 17 of the Ad Hoc Rules. It is
also the result of the choice of Lausanne, Switzerland as the seat of the
Ad Hoc Division and of its panels of arbitrators, pursuant to Article 7 of
the Ad Hoc Rules. Further, under Article 17 of the Ad Hoc Rules,
arbitration panels must decide disputes "pursuant to the Olympic
Charter, the applicable regulations, general principles of law and the
rules of law, the application of which it deems appropriate." 45 Finally,
Article 16 provides that a panel has "full power to establish the facts on
which the application is based." 46
A. The Development of Lex Sportiva During the Sydney Games
The Sydney Olympics proved to be a fruitful time for the
development of lex sportiva. A variety of disputes arose prior to and
during the Games. The breadth of disputes that the CAS deals with is
demonstrated by these cases and the existing CAS jurisprudence. 47 The
disputes ranged from Olympic selection disputes brought before the
Australian CAS prior to the Games, to national eligibility, rules of the
sport, doping, and finally to commercial issues that arose during the
Games.
B. AOC Selection Cases
Prior to the commencement of the 2000 Olympic Games, the
Australian Olympic Committee ("AOC") encountered problems
involving team selections. A number of Australian athletes who were
not selected to their Olympic Team contested nomination decisions. In
fact the number of appeals relating to Olympic selection reached over
48
forty-eight and included applications from eighteen different sports.
Of these appeals only the more controversial situations were adjudicated
by the CAS Oceania Division. These cases demonstrate the difficulties
that can arise when arbitration awards affect a third party.
The CAS Oceania Division heard and rendered a decision in relation
to a dispute between an Australian judo athlete, Rebecca Sullivan, and

IsSee Arbitration Rules of the Games of the XXVII Olympiad in Sydney, Article 17, available
at http://www.tas-cas.org/english/rules/PraRules.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2001).
46Id. at Article 16.

4 See RECUEIL DES SENTENCES DU TAS/ DIcEsr OF CAS AWARDS 1986-1998, supranote 13.
Is Louise Evans, Gang of Six Appealing Gaines Selections, SYDNEY MRN. HLD., Aug. 22, 2000,
availableat 2000 WL 24965122.
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the Judo Federation of Australia, Inc. The decision was eventually
appealed to the New South Whales Court of Appeal. 49 Sullivan claimed
that a proper implementation of the nomination criteria would have
resulted in her selection to the Olympic team over Angela Raguz.
The only issue for determination by the CAS was the proper
construction of the agreement between the applicant and the Judo
Federation of Australia. The court determined that the Agreement was
intended to confer rights and legitimate expectations to Australia's Judo
Athletes and that the Agreement formed a comprehensive code for the
nomination of athletes to the Olympic team. The Oceania CAS found
that under the proper construction of the Agreement the nomination
criteria had not been properly followed. The appeal was upheld and
Sullivan was nominated to the AOC in substitution of Raguz.
A second case before the CAS Oceania Division involved Kathryn
Watt, a member of the Australian Cycling-Federation Inc. ("ACF").
Watt applied to the CAS alleging that the nomination criteria had not
been properly applied. The purpose of the nomination criteria is to
nominate athletes most capable of producing medal winning
performances at the 2000 Olympic Games. The court noted that the
paragraphs set-out in relation to the nomination criteria specifically
referred to this goal and indicated that meeting the stipulated criteria
would not guarantee an athlete nomination.
The applicant made numerous criticisms of the considerations made
by the selectors. However, the CAS held that the Athlete Agreement
conferred a level of discretion on the Federation. The court stated that
"unless the non-compliance with the nomination criteria was so
substantial as to satisfy the Court that the decision could have been
different then any such non-compliance should be regarded as
inconsequential or immaterial and not provide a proper basis to overturn
the selectors decision." 50 Accordingly, the CAS dismissed the appeal.
In the United States, these cases had an interesting and equally
troubling parallel in the case of Lindland v. United States Wrestling
Association.5' These problematic cases seem to have their initial impetus
for going on to further proceedings from the fact that, the first time they

49 See

supra note 22 and accompanying text.

5 Kathy Watt v. ACF, CAS Oceania (August 25, 2000) (Malcolm Holmes, Arbitrator) (on

file with author).
-' 227 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000).
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were heard, the other individuals affected were not made parties before
the proceeding.
Therefore, when initial selection decisions were
reversed by the first arbitration panel, the other athlete wanted and did
launch their own case to have the matter reconsidered. They raised the
issue of the binding effect of adding a third party to a proceeding. That
issue is troubling because the contractual arrangement to arbitrate is a
consensual process of conferring jurisdiction on an arbitration panel.
C. Sydney
The cases heard by the AHD in Sydney can be split up into five
broad categories: doping violations, IF athlete suspensions, commercial
advertising issues, dispute with sports officials, and national eligibility.
Out of the fifteen cases that arose at the Games, three of them involved
doping violations. 52 Two of the doping cases involved IAAF athletes,
Dieter Baumann and Mihaela Melinte. The third doping case was the
most highly publicized dispute at the Games and involved the Romanian
Gymnast, Andreea Raducan.
The Baumann and Melinte cases involved positive drugs tests that
occurred prior to the commencement of the Games. Both athletes were
initially accredited by the IOC at the request of their respective national
Olympic committees. In the case of Baumann, following an official
determination by the IAAF arbitration panel that he had committed an
offence, he was suspended and his accreditation was revoked.
Following a positive test Melinte was provisionally suspended and her
accreditation was revoked. Thus, the focus of these cases was on the
preliminary question of jurisdiction rather than doping infractions.
Baumann's dispute reached the AHD in a unique manner. The
famous German athlete tested positive for nandrolone on two separate:
out of competition tests in mid-October and November of 1999. The
German Anti-Doping panel cleared him in July 2000, accepting
arguments that a doping infraction required an element of intent.
Referral to IAAF arbitration was made by the IAAF on August 11, 2000.
Thereafter, Baumann was named to the German Olympic Team and
received accreditation from the IOC to compete in the 2000 Games.
From September 16-18, 2000, the IAAF arbitration panel heard
5

2 Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 6, Dieter Baumann v. IOC, award
of 22 Sept., 2000 reprinted in REEB, supra note 12, at 65; Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division
(O.G. Sydney 2000), 15, Mihaela Melinte v. IAAF, award of 29 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB,
supra note 12, at 145; Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 11, Andreea
Raducan v. IOC, award of 28 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB, supranote 12, at 111.
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Baumann's case in Sydney. The panel overturned the prior German
National decision enforcing the strict liability regime and relying heavily
on CAS jurisprudence. The outcome of the application of the doping
controls was a two-year ban on the athlete. Following the IAAF
decision, the IOC removed Baumann's accreditation, prompting
Baumann to apply to the CAS in order to have the IAAF and IOC
decisions set aside.
Before the panel could examine the merits of the case, the IAAF
raised the issue of jurisdiction. It claimed that the CAS was without
jurisdiction to determine the matter on the grounds that the IAAF does
not provide for a CAS jurisdiction in its bylaws and because the issue
had already been determined by the final and binding arbitration of the
IAAF panel. Further, the IAAF refused to participate in the arbitration
process and walked out of the proceedings. The court held that pursuant
to Rule 74 in the Olympic Charter, and by virtue of the Athlete Entry
Form, it had jurisdiction to hear a dispute raised by any athlete at the
Games. The court also noted that the enforceability of the arbitration
agreement was affirmed in the Australian New South Whales decision of
Raguz.5 3 Upon concluding that they had jurisdiction over Baumann, the
panel examined its jurisdiction over the IAAF. The panel acknowledged
that Article 29 of the Olympic Charter ensures that the IAAF acts "in
conformity with the Olympic Charter."54 As a consequence the court
held that the lack of a CAS clause in the IAAF bylaws does not affect the
CAS jurisdiction because Article 74 of the Olympic Charter grants it the
necessary jurisdiction to hear the dispute. Finally, the panel determined
that the CAS has jurisdiction over NOs and the IOC by virtue of Article
74.
After establishing jurisdiction over the involved parties, the CAS
addressed a preliminary claim that the case could not be heard because it
would be contrary to the principle of res judicata.5 The panel dismissed
this contention noting that neither Baumann nor the IOC was a party to
the IAAF arbitration and that the issues in dispute had been expanded.
Therefore, the AHD was able to examine the merits of Baumann's case.
Despite reaching this determination, the court did not interfere with the
IAAF's previous decision once it was satisfied that the IAAF panel

5.See supra note 20 (discussing an example where the court dismissed the application

referring the matter to final and binding CAS arbitration clauses).
5 Olympic Charter, Article 29, available at http://www.olympic.org/ioc/e/
facts.charter/charterlif-e.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2001).
5 A matter that has been previously determined shall not be heard again.
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properly addressed the evidence. The AHD effectively operated as an
appeal court over the IAAF. The removal of Baumann's accreditation
was valid and the athlete was no longer eligible to compete in the
Games.
The CAS relied upon the decision in Baumann for the resolution of a
dispute brought before the court by Melinte. Melinte is the world record
holder in the Women's Hammer Throw and had been accredited by the
IOC to compete in the Games upon her arrival in Sydney. However, she
had tested positive for nandrolone on June 7,2000. On September 17, the
IAAF requested an explanation for the result from the applicants
Athletic Federation. Thereafter, the IAAF provisionally suspended
Melinte on the strength of the positive sample. She was removed from
competition the morning she was to compete.
The case raised many of the jurisdictional issues that were addressed
in the Baumann case and the panel relied upon its previous
determinations in support of their jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.
The IAAF still refused to be recognized as a party to the dispute, but
unlike the Baumann case, they participated during. the hearing by
answering questions.
The IAAF attempted to distinguish the
jurisdictional issues in this dispute from those in Baumann on the
grounds that the IOC did not revoke Melinte's accreditation, and
therefore, the CAS did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The
court dismissed this claim, reasoning that the athlete's removal from the
field of play constituted a dispute arising during the Games within the
meaning of Article 74 of the Olympic Charter.
The primary issue raised by Melinte was that she had been denied
due process. The court concluded that the information put before the
AHD by Melinte would have been the same information provided to the
IAAF. The panel was not persuaded by the applicants submissions and
dismissed the application. However, the court noted that its decision
was not to be viewed as a determination of whether or not Melinte had
committed a doping offense. Rather, the panel decision only denied the
applicant emergency relief in respect of the IAAF suspension.
The third doping case at the Games arose from a doping test
following competition.5 6 This case demonstrated the principle of strict

56There were thirteen positives at the Games which resulted in the removal of three gold
medals, one silver, and one bronze. All the other athletes left the Olympic Village and
were sent home without using the appeal process of CAS. World Anti-Doping Agency,
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liability. Andreea Raducan, a Romanian gymnast, placed first in the
Women's Individual All-Round Event. Following her victory, she tested
positive for the prohibited substance pseudoephedrine. Despite the high
publicity this case received, from a legal perspective it was not complex.
Although, it should be noted that the athlete had not been previously
tested, as her prior gold medals were for team sports and the IOC
medical commission only required random testing of the team athletes. 57
Raducan argued that she bore no responsibility for the doping
violation because the positive test resulted from pills given to her by the
team doctor. She also claimed that the level of the drug in her system
was not sufficient to have been performance enhancing. The CAS
sympathized with the applicant, but acknowledged that doping is a strict
liability offense and intent is not required for the commission of a
violation. The panel also stated that whether or not a competitive
advantage is achieved does not affect whether there has been a doping
offense.58 On the evidence before it, the court found that a doping
offence had been committed. The applicable rules resulted in the
invalidation of Raducan's performance. A great deal of sympathy was
generated for the athlete among the public, but the CAS noted that an
appreciation of the subjective elements of individual cases is allowed in
the IOC's determination of the particlar disciplinary sanction that will
arise following the necessary disqualification. The IOC executive board,
in an attempt to make the punishment fit the crime, only took away the
medal and did not impose any suspension on the athlete.
These three doping cases reinforce the principles of strict liability
that the CAS jurisprudence has been developing. They respect the
jurisdiction of the sports specific panel of the IAAF, while reviewing its
decisions to ensure the independence, impartiality, and proper due
process of the rights of the athlete. The Sydney Games also resulted in a
number of challenges with regard to IF suspensions. Two of the cases
involved appeals against the International Weightlifting Federation

Office of the Independent Observer, Independent Observers' Medical Report on the
Sydney Games (Oct., 2000) at Annex 20 (on file with author).
s This is a point which is noted by the Office of the Independent Observer in its report to
WADA. See WADA Independent Observer Report, Olympic Games 2000: Sydney Australia,
supranote 3, at 14.
5 However, it should be noted that it is often difficult to determine when a competitive
advantage has been achieved. See Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000),
11, Andreea Raducan v. IOC, award of 28 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB, supra note 12, at
114. On the facts of this particular case, Raducan had concentrations of pseudoephedrine
of 90.6 and 88.0. Id. The reporting threshold is 25. Id.
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("IWF"). The first of these cases59 addressed the effect of a national court
order on IFs. The IWF adopted the Samoan Weightlifting Federation's
("SWF") suspension, precluding a Samoan weightlifter from
participating in the Olympic Games. However, the athlete obtained a
Samoan court order lifting the suspension of the SWF. The CAS
acknowledged that the court order clearly affected the SWF and as such
required it to remove the suspension on the athlete. The CAS held,
however, that the Samoan court order was not binding on the IWF.
Nonetheless, the IWF's suspension was an endorsement of the SWF's
decision. Therefore, its validity depended on the validity of the SWF's
suspension. In effect, the Samoan court order removed the foundation of
the IWF's suspension and as a result the IWF's decision became invalid.
Accordingly, the CAS set aside the IWF suspension.
The second case involving the IWF was similar to the one rendered
during the Nagano Games in respect to Ross Rebagliati.60 In both
instances an international federation attempted to exercise powers that
were not within its rules. In these situations, the CAS continues to find
that a federation must have a legal basis for their disciplinary action.
The dispute in question occurred after three positive drug tests of the
Bulgarian Weightlifting Federation ("BWF") athletes prompted the IWF
to suspend the BWF.61 The IOC Executive Board allowed the suspension
of the entire team. As a consequence Tzagaev, a "clean" athlete and
member of the BWF, became ineligible to compete.
The IWF claimed that it had the power to suspend a federation for
one year following three positive drug tests in that year. The CAS noted
that the provision the IWF relied on only allowed a fine to be imposed
upon a federation. A suspension resulted only upon failure to pay the
fine. The court held that the suspension of an entire federation from the
Games, including athletes that have not committed a doping offense
must have an explicit legal basis. Accordingly, the AHD annulled the
suspension and Tzagaev went on to win a silver medal.
Both weightlifting cases reveal the independence with which CAS
carried out its adjudicative function. It did not consider itself or the
international federation to be bound by the Samoian court order. In the

59Arbitration

CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 02, SAMOA National Olympic
Committee and Sports Federation v. IWF, award of 12 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB, supra
note 12, at 28.
60 See REEB, supra note 12, at 419 (Ross Rebagliativ. FIS).
61Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 10, Alan Tzagaev v. IWF, award of
25 Sept., 2000, reprintedin REEB, supra note 12, at 101.
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case of the Bulgarian weightlifter, the CAS had no hesitation in striking
down what it considered to be an unfounded decision of the IOC.
62
The Sydney Games also gave rise to a commercially based dispute.
The dispute arose in relation to the size of a logo on a French Gymnast's
leotard. Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Olympic Charter, articles of clothing
worn by athletes can not be marked conspicuously for advertising
purposes. Specific size requirements are contained within the Rule. The
major determination for the court was whether the Rule should be read
to apply to clothing as it is manufactured or as it is worn. The CAS
concluded that the Rule included the phrase "worn or used by the
athletes"63 and, therefore, applied to clothing as worn not as
manufactured. The panel did find, however, that the Rule had been
applied inconsistently because it had not been applied to other
competitors. This factor did not alter the determination of the court that
the Rule had been correctly applied to the athlete in this case. The FFG
application was dismissed. Thus, in both Nagano 64 and Sydney, there
was at least one commercially based case. This demonstrates the range
and breadth of cases arising from the Games that may come forward to
CAS.

A number of cases during the Games required the CAS to consider
the principle of non-interference with decisions made in the course of
competition. 65 The CAS decisions in Segura66 and Nekyova67 addressed
what aspect of the game the court could review. After finishing in first
place, Segura was disqualified from the 20km walk event because three
course judges determined that he had failed to keep one foot on the
ground pursuant to the rules of the event. The panel held that they
could not review a determination of the "rules of the game" unless the

62 Arbitration

CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 14, FFG v. SOCOG, award of 30

Sept., 2000, reprintedin REEB, supra note 12, at 137.
6-1Olympic Charter,supra note 54, at RULE 61.
See Schaatsefabrick Viking B.V. v. German Speed Skating Association, in MCLAREN, supra
note 5, at 12.
65 This principle was established during the Atlanta Games in the AHD's decision in
respect to ChristopherMendyv. AIBA. See REcuEiL DES SENTENCES Du TAS/DIGEST oF CAS

AWARDS 1986-1998, supra note 13. It was also part of the reasoning in the advisory opinion
on the body suit used in swimming. See Advisory opinion for the CAS TAS 2000/C/267
AOC, an Advisory Opinion Delivered by the CAS to the Australian Olympic Committee
regarding the use of full body swimsuits (on file with author).
6Arbitration
CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 13, Bernardo Segura v. IAAF,
award of 30 Sept., 2000, reprintedin REEB, supranote 12, at 131.
67 Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 12, Rumyana Dimitrova Nekyova
v. FISA, award of 29 Sept., 2000, reprintedin REEB, supra note 12, at 123.
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rules had been applied in bad faith. Segura, however, did not directly
challenge the decision of the judges. Rather, he focused on the judges'
failure to convey his violation to him in accordance with the rules. The
AHD panel held that the court could not reverse the judges' decision
unless it was shown that the error on the part of the judges in failing to
communicate the disqualification to Segura promptly would compel the
reversal of the decision. There was no basis for such an outcome and the
disqualification of Segura was upheld.
Nekyova applied to the CAS on the grounds that the equipment
relied upon for the determination of her second place finish in the
Women's Single Skull event was inaccurate. The AHD accepted that
they cannot overturn judgment calls and technical decisions rendered
during an event. However, the court can determine if equipment was
faulty. The panel held that the technical equipment was sound since
there was no proof indicating otherwise. The court dismissed the
application.
These two cases confirm the principle of the lex sportive; that
decisions made during the course of competition will not be reversed
later in the arbitration hearing. The remaining cases that arose during
the Games involved Nationality and Eligibility. These cases called into
question the structure of Article 46 in the Olympic Charter. 68 Article 46
requires an athlete to be a National in a country for three years before
she is eligible to compete for that country. If an athlete fails to meet the
criteria, she cannot compete unless her previous country's National
Olympic Committee waives the eligibility requirement. On its face the
Section appears to be reasonable, however, the effect of the Section was
not entirely anticipated.
Two athletes, Angel Perez and Arturo Miranda, were nominated by
their National Olympic Committees (the United States and Canada
respectively) to compete in the Sydney Olympics. Both Athletes were
born in Cuba and had previously competed for their home country.
Neither Athlete established official citizenship in their new countries
until 1999. Thus, they both fell below the three year Nationality
requirement. Cuba refused to waive the three year requirement for
either athlete.

This rule is in place to ensure that any competitor in the Games is a National for the
country they are competing for. It is designed to prohibit a country from inappropriately
accrediting the athletes of another country.
6
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Miranda had not competed for Cuba in nine years and had been
residing in Canada since 1995 as a landed resident However, as
mentioned above Miranda did not obtain Canadian citizenship until
1999. The CAS found that Miranda's Cuban citizenship never continued
to exist. As a result, Miranda was not a Canadian national within the
meaning of Article 46.
The major issue before the CAS in this decision was to decide
whether Cuba had absolute discretion in allowing a reduction of the
three year requirement. The court considered the wording of Rule 46
and was forced to conclude that National Olympic Committees
("NOCs") were intended to have absolute discretion in this area. As a
consequence, it was not open to the CAS to examine the Cuban's
decision. The court was forced to dismiss the appeal and reaffirm
Miranda's ineligibility. However, in view of the circumstances of this
case, the CAS suggested "that the IOC reexamine paragraph 2 of the Byelaw to Rule 46 as presently worded to determine whether an amendment
could reduce unintended hardship in individual cases." 69 In so doing,
there was a critical implication that the IOC could have done more.
The Perez scenario unfolded in a similar manner to that of
Miranda's. However, the initial appeal to the court was raised by the
United States Olympic Committee ("USOC") and USA Canoe and
Kayak70 In this appeal the USOC failed to establish that Perez had been
a US National for three years. Thus, as a matter of international law, as
in Miranda, the court ruled against the USOC.
After the CAS dismissal of Perez I, Perez applied directly to the court
for a declaration that he could compete in the Olympics as a member of
the U.S. Olympic Team.7 The AHD upheld its determination in Perez I,
that Perez had not been a US National for three years. In addition, Perez
also argued that he should be deemed to have been a stateless person in
1993. Evidence was presented to the panel that convinced it that Perez
had been deprived of his civic rights as a Cuban when he defected in
1993 and, therefore, he should be treated as an ad hoc stateless person.
The panel adopted a definition of stateless persons as "persons who
without having been deprived of their nationality no longer enjoy the
69Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G.Sydney 2000), 03, Arturo Miranda v. IOC, award
of 13 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB, supra note 12, at 29.
0
7 Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G.
Sydney 2000), 01, USOC and USA Canoe/Kayak
v. IOC, award of 13 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB, suipra note 12, at 13 (hereinafter Perez I).
71Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G.Sydney 2000), 05, Angel Perez v. IOC, award of
19 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB, siipra note 12, at 53 (hereinafter Perez II).
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protection and assistance of their national authorities."72 The panel held
that Perez was stateless and no longer a Cuban national within the
meaning of Rule 46. Finally, the CAS considered the meaning of the
word "changed" in the By-law. The By-law specifically states: " [a]
competitor who has represented one country in the Olympic Games...,
and who has changed his nationality or acquired a new nationality, shall
not participate in the Olympic Games to represent his new country until
three years after such change or acquisition."' 3 (emphasis added). The
court held that the term change should be given a broad definition so
that it captures a change from nationality to statelessness and does not
require a change of one nationality to another. Therefore, regardless of
whether Perez was a U.S. National prior to 1999, he had been a National
since 1999 and as such may be entered as a competitor in the Games by
his new country. On these grounds, the CAS concluded that Perez
changed his nationality in 1993 and meet the requirements of Rule 46.
Perez was able to compete for the United States.
The fourth case in the series was an application by the Canadian
Olympic Association ("COA") to the court to have the Miranda issue
74
resolved by the principle in Perez 1I.
The COA raised the same
argument that Perez relied on to demonstrate that Miranda met the
change of Nationality requirements. The court found that Miranda had
not cut off his ties with Cuba and could not be considered a stateless
person. The panel concluded that Miranda's participation in the Games
remained subject to the approval of the Cuban Federation and the appeal
was dismissed.
The variety of applications brought before the court by these cases
raised issues about the principles of res judicata and estoppel. The court
had to determine who could raise an appeal to the CAS, particularly
where the court had already rendered a decision in relation to the
dispute. The possibility of appeal arose because, in these situations, not
all of the parties effected by the court's decision were initial parties
before the court. This problem was previously noted in the Australian
and American selection cases before the Games.

721d.; see generally PAUL WEIs,

NATIONALrIY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (2d
ed. 1979).
Olympic Charter,supra note 54, at RULE 46 para 2.
74Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 08, COA v. IOC, award of 24 Sept.,
2000, reprinted in REEB, supra note 12, at 83.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2001

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 [2001], Art. 3

402 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
The CAS allowed both Perez and the COA to appeal despite the fact
that both cases raised many of the same issues that were addressed in the
original appeals of the USOC and Miranda. In respect to Perez's
application the court noted that Perez was not summoned or joined as a
party to the USOC appeal. Therefore, the parties were different and his
application was deemed to be admissible on its merit. The COA appeal
was allowed as the panel acknowledged that the arbitration process is
consensual and, unless there is a lack of consent, the court will be able to
review a previous decision. While the principle of res judicata might not
apply, the issues could have been subject to estoppel.
The fifth case involved an appeal by the Cuban Olympic Committee
5
to overturn the court's earlier decision allowing Perez to participate.
The panel distinguished this application from Perez's application on the
grounds that unlike Perez, the Cuban NOC had been a party to the
previous proceedings. The court emphasized that both fairness and
finality are desirable objectives of arbitration and, that in the Perez
application, the importance of fairness compelled the panel to hear the
dispute. However, with respect to the Cuban NOC's application, the
panel felt that finality was a more pressing concern than any submissions
that would be made. The panel concluded that the Cuban NOC was
estopped from initiating new proceedings because it had been a party to
the Perez decision. As with the selection cases before the Games, the
underpinnings of the arbitration process hearing by contract and consent
were called into question.
The USOC and Perez decisions indicate that the structure of the
appeal process at the Games is such that an arbitration award rendered
by the CAS may affect parties that are not directly involved in an appeal.
This does not mean that such an award will be final and binding upon
those affected third parties. Rather, it will be at the discretion of the
third parties to raise their own applications to the court. Whether this
means that third parties will always be allowed to raise an appeal to the
court is difficult to determine. It is anticipated that the third party will
have to bring a new element to the case before the CAS will hear a
subsequent application.

75 Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 09, in the matter of Angel Perez,

award of 25 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB, supranote 12, at 91 (hereinafter Perez III).
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D. Conclusionsfrom Sydney
Athletes are entitled to have their cases reviewed absent any
potential bias. CAS in its ad hoc forum has established itself as an
independent, neutral arbitration panel. The Australian Court of Appeal
decision hi-lights the importance of the independence and neutrality of
arbitration panels. On the face of the dispute, Raguz demonstrated that
she was an excellent athlete. However, the role of the CAS is not to
assess the ability or performance of an athlete or the appropriateness of
the selection process. The CAS's sole purpose is to determine the legal
rights that relate to an athlete and to ensure that they are complied with.
In this circumstance, the CAS made a decision, notwithstanding the
possibility that Raguz was the better athlete.
Decisions from the Sydney Games established the breadth of the
CAS Jurisdiction. Athletes, NOCs, the IOC, and IFs with CAS arbitration
clauses are explicitly within its jurisdiction. Further, those IFs that do
not provide for CAS arbitration are also subject to the AHD's jurisdiction
pursuant to Articles 29 and 74 of the Olympic Charter.76
The court's jurisdiction over doping offenses committed prior to the
games, however, is unclear. It appears that the court will assess an
alleged infraction on its face and render a provisional decision in respect
to the accused athlete's eligibility to compete in the Games. The ultimate
determination of the athlete's case will fall under the appropriate
jurisdiction outside of the Games, where the positive drug test
occurred.7
The Sydney Games also reaffirmed existing legal principles that
were applied at previous Olympic Games. Following the principles
developed in Atlanta, the Sydney Games affirmed the principle of noninterference with decisions made in the course of competition. 78 The
Raducan decision illustrated the court's continued application of strict
liability regime to all doping offenses and that the consideration of the

76 Arbitration

CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 06, Dieter Baumann v. IOC and
NOC and IAAF, award of 22 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB, supra note 12, at 65.
77 Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 15, Mihaela Melinte v. IAAF,
award of 29 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB, supra note 12, at 145.
78See the Atlanta decision Christopher Mendy v. AIBA. See also Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc
Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 13, Bernardo Segura v. IAAF, award of 30 Sept., 2000,
reprinted in REEB, supra note 12, at 131; Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney
2000), 12, Rumyana Dimitrova Nekyova v. FISA and IOC, award of 29 Sept., 2000, reprinted
in REEB, supra note 12, at 123.
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subjective elements of each case is left in the hands of the IOC. The
independence of the court from the IOC was asserted and applied.
A number of the disputes during the Sydney Games raised the
question of res judicata.79 The decisions in these cases suggest that this
axiom may not apply where the party that is affected by a prior
arbitration award was not a part of the prior proceedings. It is
important, however, to uphold this principle and, any time a party was
part of the prior proceedings, they will not be able to raise a new
appeal.80 The difficulties that can arise from the concept of res judicata
indicate that, where possible, all parties that could be affected by an
arbitration award should be part of the arbitration proceedings. 81
The final concept that is displayed by the Sydney decisions is the
ability of the CAS to exercise discretionary powers. Although the court's
action is constrained entirely by the law, judicial interpretation may be
exercised to provide relief to the aggrieved parties where an injustice is
committed through a strict application of the law.82 It should be noted
that the court will stay entirely within the legal realn and will only make
logic interpretations that flow from the appropriate legal frame work.
Thus, the law still provides unjust results for some parties, and in these

79 Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 01, USOC and USA Canoe/Kayak

v. IOC, award of 13 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB, supra note 12, at 13; Arbitration CAS Ad
Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 03, Arturo Miranda v. 10C, award of 13 Sept., 2000,
reprinted in REEB, snpra note 12 at 29; Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000),
05, Angel Perez v. IOC, award of 19 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB, supra note 12 at 53;
Arbitration CAS Ad. Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 06, Dieter Baumann v. 1OC. and
NOC and IAAF, award of 22 Sept., 2000, reprintedin REEB, supra note 12, at 65; Arbitration
CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000), 08, COA v. IOC, award of 24 Sept., 2000,
reprinted in REEB, snpra note 12, at 83; Arbitration CAS Ad Hoc Division (O.G. Sydney 2000),
09, in the materof Angel Perez, award of 25 Sept., 2000, reprinted in REEB, snpra note 12, at 91.
80 This is illustrated by No. 9 Sydney. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
81The importance of adhering to this concept is also demonstrated by the difficulties that
arose out of the Olympic Selection criteria cases and the National Eligibility cases. The two
Olympic Selection Criteria cases are Lindland v. U.S.A. Wrestling Association and U.S.
Olympic Connittee, 227 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000), and Angela Raguz v. Rebecca Sullivan &
ORS N.S.W.C.A. 290 (2000). The National Eligibility cases are No. 1 Sydney USOC and
USA Canoe/Kayak v. IOC, No. 3 Sydney Arturo Mirandav. IOC, No. 5 Sydney Angel Perez v.
IOC, No. 8 Sydney COA v. IOC, and No. 9 Sydney in the matter of Angel Perez. See supra
notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
82 This is illustrated by No. 5 Sydney Angel Perez v. 1OC.
See supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
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situations the court can only recommend that the IOC alter the Olympic
Charter.

83

IV. CONCLUSION

The lex sportiva developed by the CAS appears to provide the
appropriate legal machinery to resolve a breadth of sports related
disputes. The eradication of illegal drugs from sport and the return to a
fair playing field in sport will require a great deal of work from
international and national organizations around the world. Nonetheless,
the success of the CAS suggests that one of the pieces required to solve
this complex puzzle is in place.

83

This is illustrated by No. 3 Sydney Arturo Miranda v. IOC. See supra note 69 and

accompanying text.
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